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the explosive eruption on the 14th april 2010 of the eyjafjallajökull volcano, Iceland, caused an unprecedented 
closure of uk, european and north atlantic air space, which must be understood if similar situations are to 
be better managed in the future. this report examines the eyjafjallajökull eruption, its impact on aviation 
and implications for the future, in the expectation of further activity in Iceland. By bringing together expertise 
from across the university, the ucl Institute for risk and disaster reduction provides an integrated analysis 
covering volcanology, geophysics, rock and ice physics, meteorology, statistics, mechanical engineering, 
systems engineering, transport engineering, hazard and risk communication, law and ethics. 
We find:
the current volcanic activity in Iceland is not unusual. explosive eruptions, comparable to the 2010 • 
eyjafjallajökull event, occur in Iceland every 20 to 40 years on average. the 1821-23 eyjafjallajökull 
eruption lasted 14 months.
Volcanic activity at eyjafjallajökull only becomes a major problem over europe if this activity is • 
coincident with north to north westerly air flow between Iceland and North West Europe, which prevails 
for only 6% of the time. the implication, however, is that the most recent disruption of air transport in 
mid-may may not be the last, despite the current (24th may) cessation of ash production.
the impact of the eruption on regional air space could have been predicted and better prepared for • 
as the growing problem of aircraft-ash cloud encounters has been recognised for decades. similarly, 
the potential for ash clouds, specifically from Icelandic volcanoes, to interfere with air traffic in UK, 
european and north atlantic air-space was appreciated by the aviation industry well before the start 
of the eyjafjallajökull eruption.
the response to the ash cloud’s arrival in uk and adjacent air space was entirely reactive and therefore • 
less effective than it should have been. this was primarily a function of the failure to recognise in 
advance the potential threat presented by volcanic ash clouds from Iceland. the situation was made 
worse by the inflexible nature of existing aviation protocols and by the absence of any pre-existing 
agreement on safe ash levels.
Volcanic ash in the atmosphere can be highly damaging to the airframes, avionics and engines of • 
civil jet aircraft: ingestion by engines of 2 gm-3 of ash has caused loss of power and near-crashes. 
The newly defined safe limits of ash are ad hoc and arbitrary and cannot be scientifically justified. 
determining a range of robust best-estimate safe levels of ash for a wide range of situations, aircraft, 
engine types and pilot responses will cost time and money and will require the commitment of the 
aviation industry.
since the start of the eyjafjallajökull eruption there has been much speculation about an eruption of • 
the larger neighbouring katla volcano. With the high frequency of eruptions of katla, an eruption in 
the short term is a strong possibility. It is likely to be preceded by new earthquake activity. presently 
there is no unusual seismicity under katla.
there is no doubt that future explosive eruptions in Iceland and elsewhere, coupled with appropriate • 
meteorological conditions, have the potential to cause further disruption to air transport. It is not 
possible, however, to predict either when this will occur, or at what scale.
the eyjafjallajökull eruption demonstrated the limits of a precautionary approach. this then raises • 
ethical issues, over who is to articulate the values to be taken into account when managing risk.
ExEcutivE Summary
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the explosive eruption of the eyjafjallajökull volcano, 
Iceland, caused an unprecedented closure of uk, 
european and north atlantic air space for 6 days  in 
april 2010 and this was followed by further episodes 
of air travel disruption. as a consequence a number 
of challenging questions are now being asked 
of volcanologists, meteorologists, geophysicists, 
engineers, regulators and airline bosses:
What are phreatomagmatic eruptions?• 
Is the eruption of eyjafjallajökull unusual?• 
are meteorological conditions abnormal?• 
could the impact of the eruption on • 
european air space have been predicted? 
Has the response to the eruption been • 
appropriate and effective? 
Why is volcanic ash a problem for aircraft? • 
Is there a safe concentration of volcanic • 
ash in the atmosphere that aircraft can fly 
in? 
How long is the disruption likely to last? • 
Will neighbouring katla erupt? • 
are we likely to see this sort of event • 
again?
How can we better prepare for such • 
events?
eyjafjallajökull, situated in southern Iceland in the 
eastern Volcanic zone, is a stratovolcano 1666m in 
elevation with a crater 2-3km across, and is covered 
by an ice cap 70-200m thick and 100km2 in expanse. 
the explosive eruption of april 2010 was preceded 
by earthquake activity at depth (with magnitudes 
1-3) around december 2009 and an effusive (lava 
extruding) flank eruption at Fimmvörðuháls, through 
a fissure vent not covered by the ice cap.
the explosive phase of the eruption started on 14th 
april from the summit crater, punching through the 
ice cap and causing melt waters to mix with the 
rising magma. the cold melt water quenched the 
magma causing it to fragment explosively into large 
volumes of very fine ash that were ejected high 
into the atmosphere; a style of eruption termed 
phreatomagmatic (see following section).
It was this fine ash, considered to be a potential 
hazard for civil jet aircraft, coupled with an unusually 
stable weather system and northwesterly winds from 
Iceland, which resulted effectively in the closure of 
uk and adjacent air space and air travel disruption 
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over much of Europe. By 21st April 95,000 flights 
had been cancelled, resulting in chaos and leaving 
hundreds of thousands of passengers stranded. 
under pressure from airlines, the uk civil aviation 
authority (caa) established ad hoc thresholds for 
safe ash concentrations that allowed the resumption 
of commercial flights.
the phreatomagmatic phase of an eruption will 
diminish if either the water supply is exhausted or is 
cut off as the volcano builds its edifice. On the 25th 
April, the Icelandic Met Office reported that external 
water had not affected the vent activity much since 
the 18th april; the explosivity was magmatic rather 
than phreatomagnmatic and the ash produced was 
coarser. flow of lava began on 21st april. since 
may, the activity has changed to a mild but sustained 
magmatic explosive eruption producing significant 
amounts of vesicular ash and pumice. But fine ash is 
no longer being washed out, so more is getting into 
the high plume and being widely dispersed. 
There are significant variations in the level of activity 
of the on-going eruption, and on 23rd may ash 
production was minimal.
phreatomagmatic eruptions are 
characterised by violent explosions that 
result from the mixing of rising magma with 
water. In the case of the eyjafjallajökull 
eruption, the source of water was its melting 
ice cap. Water initially chills the magma 
at the interface to a hot glass, which then 
shatters; the water penetrates the mass 
of shattered hot glass and is transformed 
into high-pressure superheated steam by 
a runaway process of heat transfer and 
further magma fragmentation, until a violent 
explosion results.
the scanning electron microscope (sem) 
image of an ash sample shown in figure 3, 
Figure 2. Synthetic aperture radar (Sar) image of 
Eyjafjallajökull on 15.4.10. (Source: icelandic coast Guard, 
2010)
What arE phrEatomaGmatic 
EruptionS?
table 1.  chronology of the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull
1821-23 previous eruption
12/09 seismicity starts
20/3/10 Fimmvörðuháls flank eruption
14/4/10 explosive eruption
15/4/10 6-day closure of uk air space
5/10 further closures of air space
Figure 3. ash fall collected from Surrey, England, 17/4/10. SEm image 
shows a textbook phreatomagmatic texture
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provides a textbook example of a phreatomagmatic 
texture comprising:
Agglutinated grains•	
porous masses of tiny mineral and glass 
grains formed in the advecting plume. tm~ 
800-1000oc.
Glass shards•	
sharp grains coated in micron-sized ash. 
tm~ 800-1000
oc. there is a paucity of 
vesicular (containing bubbles) glass.
Mineral grains•	
angular grains showing multiple 
microfractures arising from thermal and 
mechanical shock. tm~ 1000-1900
oc. 
the signature mineral epidote is present, 
indicating high temperature hydrothermal 
alteration.
explosions resulting from magma-water interaction 
can be relatively moderate, and even suppressed 
altogether if an over-abundant water supply quenches 
the magma, but they are especially violent at a 
water:magma ratio of 1:3. eruption columns formed 
are typically water-rich. condensation of this water 
usually reduces column height to 10 km or less and 
scrubs corrosive gases, such as fluorine and sulphur 
dioxide, from the eruption column.
the fragmentation process and resulting explosions 
are especially violent when viscous magmas are 
involved.
the effect of water mixing with magma is to lower the 
viscosity threshold for explosive eruptions, with the 
implication that for Iceland by far the great majority 
of explosive events are phreatomagmatic explosive 
basaltic (lower viscosity) eruptions (Gudmundsson et 
al., 2008).
Violent phreatomagmatic eruptions produce 
especially fine-grained tephra, with a high fraction 
of glassy particles <1µm across, but because of the 
abundant water these accrete into larger particles in 
the eruption column (>10µm across and up to 1mm 
or more). 
table 2. magma-water interactions in volcanism
non-explosive interaction
Near-surface inflow of lava into water
Quenching & thermal granulation of magmatic 
melt
Explosive interaction
Sub-surface interaction of magma and 
groundwater
explosive vaporization after structural failure
Volcanic ‘molten fuel coolant interaction’ after 
formation of explosive water-in-magma prefix
thermo-hydraulic explosion, intense shock-
wave generation, significant fragmentation of 
wall-rocks
(Source: Zimanowski, 2001)
Figure 4. Fragmentation energy (Source: Sharon et al., 
1996)
Figure 5. Influence of magma composition (Source: 
Zimanowski, 2001)
Explosive eruptions
(high force) generate fine grain 
ash (large surface area)
Summary: phreatomagmatic eruptions tend 
to be violent and explosive. eyjafjallajökull has 
exhibited this activity, most notably during the 
closure of air space in mid-april.
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explosivity of an eruption is measured on the Volcano 
explosivity Index (VeI). non-explosive and small 
eruptions, with VEIs of 0 and 1, erupt lava flows and 
small volumes of tephra (airborne particles of ash, 
pumice etc), by contrast the most explosive eruption 
of last century, pinatubo, erupted over 10 km3 of 
tephra with a VeI of 6:
Volcanism in Iceland is the surface expression of the 
interaction of the deep mantle plume beneath Iceland 
with a constructive tectonic plate boundary (the mid-
Atlantic ridge; figure 1), at which the European and 
north american plates are moving apart at about 
20 mm/yr. throughout Iceland a number of volcanic 
zones exist, with each one containing distinct volcanic 
systems that usually host fissure swarms and a 
central volcano.
Iceland exhibits a range of volcano types and 
eruption styles, and many eruptions originate 
beneath ice sheets, adding great variation to the 
characteristics and styles of volcanic activity. Basalt 
(magma with low silica content and low viscosity) is 
Figure 6. vEi and ejecta volume correlation (Source: newhall 
& Self, 1982)
most common, but the central volcanoes in particular 
also erupt andesite, dacite and rhyolite (magmas 
with higher silica contents and viscosities), which 
erupt explosively. consequently, eruption styles have 
ranged from lava flow-dominated eruptions of low 
explosivity through to highly explosive ‘plinian’ style 
eruptions of VeI 5 or more. the interaction of magma 
with water, through the melting of ice as has occurred 
during the eyjafjallajökull eruption, produces violent 
phreatomagmatic explosions from both basaltic and 
more viscous magmas. 
reconstruction of the historic volcanic record in 
Iceland has revealed 205 eruptive events at an 
average of 20–25 eruptions per century. about 
150 of these involved significant explosive activity 
(thordarson & larsen, 2007; Gudmundsson et 
al., 2008). the eastern Volcanic zone is by far the 
most active, with 80 percent of verified eruptions 
originating here. It contains the six most active 
volcanic systems in Iceland: askja, katla, Hekla, 
Grímsvötn, Bárdarbunga–Veidivötn, and Krafla. The 
first four of these and Öraefajökull have produced 
20 large explosive eruptions in historic times with 
VeIs of 5 and 6, compared with a VeI of 4 for the 
2010 eyjafjallajökull event (table 3). eruption column 
heights of 20 to 30 km (2 to 3 times the typical height 
of the largest eruption columns from eyjafjallajökull) 
have been witnessed, and significant tephra falls in 
northern europe – with deposits up to a few mm thick 
and particle sizes up to 0.1 mm  – occur around once 









6 Grimsvötn 8230 Bc
6 laki 1783
iS thE Eruption oF 
EyjaFjallajökull unuSual?
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arE mEtEoroloGical conditionS 
abnormal?
the impact of the eyjafjallajökull ash plume on 
European air space is strongly controlled by air flow 
from Iceland and here we analyse this process. the 
prevailing meteorological conditions during the main 
period of closure of much of european air space 
during 15-23 april 2010 were dominated by north to 
northwesterly air flow between Iceland and North West 
Europe (figure 7). Though such conditions are atypical 
they are not considered to be particularly unusual. 
Analysis of air flow in the region using monthly mean 
mid-level (300-700mb) wind direction data from the 
ncep/ncar reanalysis data set (kalnay et al., 
1996 and kistler et al., 2001) shows the prevailing 
wind direction to be southwesterly (~60% of months). 
under these conditions any Icelandic ash plume 
would be directed towards the arctic ocean and/or 
northern scandinavia and would have much less 
impact on air transport. similar conditions to those 
that prevailed during the first closure of air space 
occur around 8% of the time.  since the data analysed 
are monthly means this does not suggest that such 
conditions persist for a month with this frequency, but 
that around 8% of months have lengthy periods (long 
enough to dominate the average) during which such 
conditions prevail.
In around 30% of months the prevailing mean mid-
level wind direction is between northerly and westerly. 
for the mean monthly direction to be westerly it is 
likely there is a northerly component to the flow for 
some time during the month (particularly considering 
that the normative flow is southwesterly).  For 
example, the mean flow for April 2010 was almost 
due westerly, though northwesterly during the week 
14-21 april when air space was closed.  thus some 
flow towards North West Europe from Iceland can 
be expected to occur during around 30% of months. 
using the above frequencies an estimate of north to 
northwesterly flow from Iceland prevailing 6% of the 
time could be considered conservative. 
Figure 7. ash plume drifting southward from iceland (Source: 
naSa, 2010)
per century (Lacasse, 2001; Haflidason et al., 2000). 
the climactic explosive phases of these eruptions 
usually last less than 1 day, although such phases 
may occur more than once during eruptions lasting 
some months or more. dispersion of the tephra 
in the atmosphere between Iceland and europe 
means that tephra falls at sites in europe from the 
climactic explosive phases typically last some days. 
smaller explosive eruptions, comparable to the 
Summary: periods of north to northwesterly air 
flow from Iceland are atypical, but not unusual, 
and probably occur about 6% of the time.
2010 eyjafjallajökull eruption, occur somewhere in 
Iceland every 20 to 40 years on average: the 63-
year gap between the 1947 Hekla eruption and the 
2010 eyjafjallajökull eruption is unusual, but not 
exceptionally long. 
Summary: the current volcanic activity in Iceland 
is not unusual.
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could thE impact oF thE Eruption 
on EuropEan air SpacE havE bEEn 
prEdictEd?
the generation of an ash cloud across the uk and 
much of europe as a consequence of an eruption in 
Iceland is far from unprecedented. a number of ash 
horizons preserved in the peat-lands of scotland and 
northern england, testify to Icelandic eruptions around 
4300, 2176, 1150, and 500 years ago that deposited 
ash across parts of the uk, while Iceland-sourced 
ash layers are also found in Ireland, Germany and 
elsewhere in europe (Barber et al. 2008). In 1875, 
the explosive eruption of askja, resulted in visible 
ash falls across norway and sweden (thorarinsson 
1981), and most recently, in 1947, a moderate (4 
on the Volcanic explosivity Index) eruption of Hekla 
produced significant ash across the region. 
In the context of aviation safety, the difference between 
1947 and 2010 is the advent and rapid expansion 
of mass air transport. the emergence of volcanic 
ash as a potentially significant threat to aviation only 
began to be recognised around 40 years ago, and is 
primarily a function of two factors: (1) the introduction 
(in the 1970s) of large, wide-bodied aircraft with 
engines that operate at high temperatures, and (2) 
the speedy and sustained growth in air traffic, which, 
until recently, was expanding at around 5% annually. 
Volcanic ash and fast-moving (≥ 800 km/hr) jet aircraft 
are not compatible, and the damaging consequences 
of the two coming together are manifold. By the late 
1970s, a number of encounters between jet aircraft 
and ash clouds, notably over japan and alaska, had 
resulted in minor damage, but it was the near-loss 
of two Boeing 747 aircraft in the 1980s, due to the 
action of volcanic ash, that highlighted the potential 
seriousness of the issue. Between 1980 and 1998, 
alone, volcanic ash clouds, up to 3000 km from their 
source, have wrought damage to aircraft engines, 
avionics and airframes, amounting to more than 
usd250 million (miller & casadevall, 2000). the 
problem refuses to go away, and encounters continue 
to occur between ash clouds and civil jet aircraft, with 
a minimum of ca. 100 recorded events between 1973 
and 2000 (see figure 8), (Guffanti & Miller, 2002), 
occurring primarily as a consequence of ineffective 
or non-existent warnings or inaccurate estimates of 
ash cloud locations.
Given that civil aviation protocols (prior to the current 
eruption) have required the simple and straightforward 
response that discernable volcanic ash clouds 
must be avoided at all costs, it was inevitable that 
improved remote sensing capabilities, which allowed 
the detection and tracking of diluted ash clouds 
remote from their source volcanoes, would be likely 
to present problems to airline traffic. In fact, this 
issue was highlighted in 2007 at the 4th International 
Workshop on Volcanic ash (rotorua, new zealand), 
where it was recognised that ’as remote sensing 
techniques improve, it is likely that the aggregate 
areas where ash is sensed or inferred will increase, 
possibly leading to over-warning for ash and cost-
blowouts for airlines’ (International airways Volcano 
Watch operations Group [IaVWopsG], 2008a). 
Furthermore, the specific threat to the aviation industry 
from a future Icelandic eruption was acknowledged at 
the fourth meeting of the IaVWopsG, held in paris 
in 2008. Here the Group considered a suggestion 
from the Icelandic Meteorological Office (IMO) that 
the installation of a second doppler weather radar in 
eastern Iceland would assist monitoring of volcanic 
activity in the area. the IaVWopsG agreed that 
this ‘would be likely to optimise radar coverage over 
Figure 8. number of reported aircraft encounters with 
volcanic ash clouds from 1973-2000 (Source: Guffanti & 
miller, 2002)
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Iceland for volcanic cloud monitoring’. It also noted 
that eruptions, such as at Grímsvötn (which erupted 
in 2004 causing short-term disruption of Icelandic 
air traffic) ‘could have a major impact on aircraft 
operations over the nat [north atlantic] regions since 
Icelandic volcanoes were situated close to important 
air routes’. although the Group agreed that a second 
radar would be a useful tool in relation to measuring 
the nature, height and extent of eruption columns 
and plumes, it determined that a detailed technical 
evaluation would be needed before it could make a 
definitive assessment of the proposal, and such an 
evaluation was outside the terms of reference of the 
Summary: the growing problem of aircraft-
ash cloud encounters has been recognised for 
decades. similarly, the potential for ash clouds, 
specifically from Icelandic volcanoes, to interfere 
with air traffic in UK, European and North Atlantic 
air-space was appreciated by (at least) some 
elements of the aviation industry well before the 
start of the eyjafjallajökull eruption.
Group (IaVWopsG, 2008b).
haS thE rESponSE to thE Eruption 
bEEn appropriatE and EFFEctivE? 
the havoc arising from the eruption of eyjafjallajökull 
has been presented in many circles as being a 
consequence of the event being both unprecedented 
and unexpected – neither is the case. as previously 
discussed, ash from Icelandic eruptions have reached 
the uk and europe on numerous occasions. despite 
this, the potential threat from Icelandic eruptions – 
both in relation to impact on the aviation industry and 
to human health – is not included on the uk national 
risk register, established in 2008 to point-up likely 
threats to the nation.
It is rare for any volcano to erupt without pre-cursory 
warning signs, and eyjafjallajökull followed this 
pattern. prior to the start of the eruption on march 
20th, the possibility of an eruption had been flagged 
for some time. Seismicity had been significantly 
above background levels since december 2009, 
climbing further in the three weeks preceding the start 
of activity and accompanied by deformation since the 
start of the year.
prior to the ash cloud reaching uk air space on april 
15th the volcano had been in eruption for almost four 
weeks, a period of time ample for contingency plans to 
have been put in place should the potential threat of ash 
to uk air space have been recognised and appreciated 
in advance. Ideally, these would have addressed those 
problems associated with maintaining safe flying in 
crowded air space blanketed periodically by a dilute 
ash cloud; most notably (i) ensuring infrastructure 
was in place to allow adequate monitoring of the 
cloud in order to determine concentration levels; (ii) 
evaluating the appropriateness and effectiveness of 
programs capable of forecasting ash cloud evolution; 
(iii) working with engine and aircraft manufacturers 
and the airlines to agree safe ash levels and working 
procedures that minimised disruption to flights. These 
issues have now, of course, been (or are being) 
addressed, but within the less than ideal pressurised 
environment of crisis management rather than the 
relatively composed setting of hazard preparedness. 
the reality of the situation was that airlines, 
passengers and other stakeholders were caught 
completely by surprise when, on the basis of a 
Volcanic ash advisory issued by the london Volcanic 
Ash Advisory Centre (operated by the Met Office), the 
UK national air traffic control NATS banned all non-
emergency flights in UK controlled airspace on 15th 
april. similar action took place on the continent. (see 
Box 1 for further details of the volcanic ash warning 
framework and its evolution). 
With little experience of dealing with volcanic ash 
hazard and no forward planning, aviation authorities 
in countries affected by the ash cloud followed 
international protocols designed to prevent aircraft 
coming into contact with any discernable cloud of 
volcanic ash, and enforced blanket bans on all flights. 
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box 1. Framework for warning the aviation community of volcanic ash hazard
In response to dangerous close encounters between aircraft and ash clouds in the 1980s, the 
International civil aviation organisation (Icao) established the International airways Volcano Watch 
(IaVW), charged – in the simplest terms – with keeping volcanic ash clouds and civil aircraft apart. on 
advice from the Wmo (World meteorological organisation), the Icao designated an array of Volcanic 
ash advisory centres (Vaacs), which became operational during the course of the 1990s. currently, 
there are nine Vaacs, each having responsibility for advising international aviation of the location and 
movement of ash clouds within a particular region. the london Vaac is responsible for monitoring and 
forecasting ash movement over the uk, Iceland and the north-eastern part of the north atlantic ocean. In 
addition to providing volcanic ash advisories (Vaa), to the aviation community, Vaacs also interface, as 
appropriate, with volcano observatories, Meteorological Watch Offices (MWOs), which issue significant 
meteorological information (SIGMET), and air traffic control centres. Countries with volcanoes monitor 
activity via dedicated observatories that use a variety of techniques to evaluate when an eruption will 
occur and how its hazards may develop. detecting whether a volcano is emitting ash can be problematic 
(e.g. Webley & mastin, 2009), especially if the volcano is remote, so satellite imaging is used to detect 
any thermal anomalies or ash plumes, as conventional radar techniques cannot detect ash particles 
(prata and tupper, 2009). In addition lIdar (light detection and ranging) is playing an increasingly 
important role in detecting ash (sassen et al., 2007). once a monitoring observatory has detected that a 
volcano is ejecting ash, it assigns an aviation colour code that ranges from green, through yellow, orange 
to red (table 4) reflecting increasing levels of activity and ash generation, allowing aviation stakeholders 
to take appropriate action (Gardner, 2006). this colour code is standardised within Icao protocols and 
triggers VAACs, MWOs, National Air Traffic Control Services (NATS) and airline companies to follow 
agreed procedures. there are limitations to the appropriateness of colour codes. most notably, they are 
designed to warn of ash hazard in the immediate vicinity of an erupting volcano, and are not suited to 
providing warnings of distal ash clouds. although internationally standardised in 2005, the aviation colour 
codes are used routinely only in the usa, and are not globally implemented. It is noteworthy that in the 
case of the Eyjafjallajökull eruption, the aviation colour red alert (defined as: ‘Eruption is imminent with 
significant emission of volcanic ash into the atmosphere likely OR eruption is underway or suspected with 
significant emission of volcanic ash into the atmosphere’) was indicated only in the sixth ash advisory 
issued by the london Vaac.
table 4. aviation color code used by uSGS volcano observatories
colour description
Green
Volcano is in typical background, noneruptive state or, after a change from a higher 
level, volcanic activity has ceased and volcano has returned to noneruptive background 
state.
yellow
Volcano is exhibiting signs of elevated unrest above known background level
or, after a change from a higher level, volcanic activity has decreased significantly but 
continues to be closely monitored for possible renewed increase.
orange
Volcano is exhibiting heightened or escalating unrest with increased potential of 
eruption, timeframe uncertain, OR, eruption is underway with no or minor volcanic-
ash emissions (ash-plume height specified, if possible).
red
Eruption is imminent with significant emission of volcanic ash into the atmosphere 
likely, OR, eruption is underway or suspected with significant emission of volcanic ash 
into the atmosphere [ash-plume height specified, if possible].
(Source: avo, 2010)
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This action does not reflect a failure of the extant ash 
warning system for aviation; rather it is a function 
of the failure of the aviation community to agree, in 
advance, safe ash concentration thresholds. In fact, 
once the ash cloud was detected, the established 
warning system worked to the extent that:
the standardised Icao protocols were • 
followed
the precautionary approach, arising from • 
the priority to keep aircraft and ash apart, 
ensured that safety was not compromised 
while uncertainties remained about ash 
concentrations
the structure of the decision making • 
process and the relationship between the 
Vaac and caa/nats appears to have 
worked in so far as it produced a decision 
to close air space according to Icao 
protocols
The Met Office has been accused, in some circles, 
of being at least partly responsible, due to a 
variety of difficult to justify reasons, for the six-
day shutdown in april. at this time the london 
Vaac was issuing maps with their volcanic ash 
advisory without any data on concentrations levels 
(excepting that the cloud outline is defined by the 200 
μgm-3 threshold). at the time, this was all that was 
required according to prevailing aviation protocols for 
avoiding discernable ash clouds, irrespective of the 
concentration of particles. once it became obvious 
that spatial information on the concentrations of ash 
was essential if safe limits were to be established 
that would allow air space to reopen, the Met Office’s 
name (numerical atmospheric-dispersion modelling 
environment) computer model, developed to monitor 
the dispersion of particulate clouds, was able to 
supply ash concentration forecasts that allowed a 
range of thresholds to be established at the request 
of the aviation community. this model had been 
previously validated against other Vaac capabilities 
in international experiments, and in real emergency 
incidents, including volcanic eruptions and the 2005 
Buncefield oil depot explosion. According to the Met 
Office, NAME output, during this event, has also 
been verified favourably against (admittedly less than 
ideal) observations. at time of writing (may 22nd), the 
Met Office is issuing 18-hour and 5-day ash forecast 
charts for a range of altitudes.
In the broadest terms, therefore, the response to 
the ash cloud has been less effective than it could 
have been, not because of inadequate observation 
or modelling of ash concentrations, but because the 
real threat of ash from Icelandic volcanoes was not 
recognised. this absence of awareness ensured that 
no attempt was made to prepare for the potential 
arrival of an ash cloud in uk, european and north 
atlantic air space, either in the build-up to eruption 
or in the first few weeks of eruption itself. The purely 
reactive response, once the cloud arrived, was made 
worse by the inflexible nature of the existing protocols 
and by the absence of any pre-existing agreement on 
safe ash levels.
Summary: the response to the ash cloud’s 
arrival in uk and adjacent air space was entirely 
reactive and therefore less effective than it could 
have been. this was primarily a function of the 
failure to recognise in advance the potential threat 
presented by volcanic ash clouds from Iceland. 
The situation was made worse by the inflexible 
nature of existing aviation protocols and by the 
absence of any pre-existing agreement on safe 
ash levels.
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Volcanic ash presents a problem for modern jet-
powered (in particular) aircraft for two main reasons. 
firstly, such ash is silica-rich and therefore abrasive, 
especially when striking an aircraft at a relative speed 
in excess of 800 km/hr. secondly, the composition of 
most volcanic ash is such that its melting temperature 
lies within the operating temperature range (> 
1000°c) of modern, large, jet engines (miller & 
casadevall, 2002). the effects of ash on an aircraft 
depend on specific circumstances, which include the 
concentration of volcanic ash in the cloud, the length 
of time the aircraft spends within the cloud, and the 
actions taken by the pilots while in the cloud.
the primary effects of ash on aircraft involve 
abrasion of forward-facing surfaces, such as the 
windshield and leading edges of the wings, together 
with accumulations of ash in surface openings – most 
importantly the engines. Ingestion of ash into engines 
causes abrasion damage to compressor fan blades. 
more critically, melting of ash and the accumulation of 
re-solidified ash on turbine nozzle guide vanes, can - 
and has - resulted in compressor stall and complete 
loss of engine thrust (miller & casadevall, 2000). 
most commercial aircraft power-plant are turbofans, 
wherein the low pressure compressor acts as a fan 
that supplies air to the engine core and to a by-pass 
duct. The bypass air flow either passes to a separate 
‘cold nozzle’ or mixes with the low pressure turbine 
exhaust gases, before expanding through a ‘mixed 
flow nozzle’ to give better fuel efficiency, higher thrust 
and lower noise level. the operating temperature 
in the combustor typically reaches 1100 to 1400°c, 
easily high enough to melt any ash particles present 
in the combustion chamber. this silica-melt may 
fuse onto the blades and other parts of the turbine, 
as seen in figure 9, causing an engine stall. The 
standard procedure of the engine control system 
when it detects the onset of a stall is to increase 
power which, in this case, would only exacerbate the 
problem.
More specific effects of ash on jet aircraft, determined 
by experiment, are summarised in Box 2.
Figure 9. Engine damage from ash encounter in 1982 (photo: 
Eric moody, british airways)
The combined consequences for an aircraft flying into 
an ash cloud can be degraded engine performance 
(including flame out), loss of visibility, and failure 
of critical navigational and operational instruments 
(Guffanti & miller, 2002). the most critical effects are 
those that compromise engine performance in flight. 
these constitute a serious safety hazard requiring 
preventative risk-management strategies, which, until 
the recent crisis could be summarised as ‘avoid at all 
costs’. this somewhat extreme strategy was largely 
the consequence of two serious encounters between 
civil jet aircraft and ash clouds in the 1980s. 
In 1982, the night-time coming together of a 
Ba747 aircraft and the ash plume from Indonesia’s 
Galunggung volcano, resulted in loss of power to 
all four engines and the plane dropping in excess of 
7,500m in 16 minutes before the engines restarted, 
allowing the aircraft to make an emergency landing. 
In 1989 a klm747 also lost power to all four engines, 
after encountering an ash cloud from alaska’s 
redoubt volcano. after dropping close to 4,500m in 
four minutes, the plane’s engines were eventually 
restarted just 1–2 minutes from impact. total damage 
Why iS volcanic aSh a problEm For 
jEt aircraFt? 
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box 2. damage effects of volcanic ash on jet aircraft 
(after Guffanti & miller, 2002)
deposition of ash on hot-section • 
components
erosion of engine compressor blades • 
and rotor-path components
Blockage of fuel nozzles and cooling • 
passages
contamination of oil systems and • 
bleed-air supply
opacity of windscreen and landing • 
lights due to ‘sandblasting’
erosion of antenna surfaces• 
plugging of the pitot-static system • 
used to indicate aircraft speed
Summary: Volcanic ash in the atmosphere can 
be very damaging to the airframes, avionics and 
engines of civil jet aircraft. on two occasions, 
ingestion of ash has caused loss of power to all 
four engines of Boeing 747 aircraft, resulting in 
near-crashes.
iS thErE a SaFE concEntration oF 
volcanic aSh in thE atmoSphErE 
that aircraFt can Fly in?  
past damaging encounters between civil jets and 
volcanic ash clouds have occurred close to erupting 
volcanoes where the concentration of ash in the 
atmosphere is high. aircraft that have experienced 
rapid engine shutdown appear to have been exposed 
to ash concentrations of around 2 gm-3, which 
translates to an engine throughput of about 1000 
kg/hr. examination of the klm747 that experienced 
loss of engine power over alaska in 1989, revealed 
around 80 kg of ash in each turbine.
since the serious encounters of the 1980s, the 
recommended aviation industry risk strategy has 
been for pilots to avoid volcanic ash plumes or to exit 
them as soon as possible using a descending turn 
and following a reverse bearing. such strategies were 
designed, however, to prevent the coming together of 
aircraft and columns of dense ash close to erupting 
volcanoes in places like alaska and Indonesia, where 
volcanic activity is near ubiquitous. they were not 
established to handle the lower risk associated with 
more dilute ash clouds relatively remote from source. 
furthermore, they were designed for air-routes 
with room to manoeuvre, which made avoidance 
and alternative flight paths possible. They were not 
suited to a situation that involved a large, extended, 
ash cloud – initially of unknown density – spread 
across the crowded air space of the uk and western 
europe.
With no other guidelines available, therefore, the 
decision of the uk nats, and similar organizations on 
the continent, to issue a near blanket no-fly ban once 
a discernable volcanic cloud was detected, must be 
viewed as justifiable. This is reflected in a statement 
on may 15th, in which andrew Haines, chief executive 
of the uk caa accused the aviation industry of ‘buck 
passing’ by blaming safety regulators for outdated 
volcanic ash protocols that were unable to cope 
with the situation presented by the eyjafjallajökull 
eruption.
to engines, avionics and airframe amounted to more 
than usd80 million. the advent of the 1990s saw 
a further usd100 million damage sustained by 
commercial aircraft (some in the air; others on the 
ground) as a consequence of the 1991 eruption of 
pinatubo in the philippines. 
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the core of the problem lies in the fact that, prior to 
the eruption, the aviation industry had still not agreed 
a safe threshold of ash in the atmosphere, below 
which aircraft would be permitted to fly. Until April 
2010, more than 30 years of civil aircraft encounters 
with ash clouds had failed to concentrate the minds of 
stakeholders sufficiently to establish an agreed safe 
limit. the issue was highlighted in 2008 at the 4th 
meeting of the International airways Volcano Watch 
operations Group (IaVWopsG, 2008b) where the 
situation seems to have been explained away partly 
as a consequence of difficulties in attracting formal 
aviation industry representation at science-focused 
workshops on volcanic ash. two years later, as 
eyjafjallajökull started to erupt, no progress appears 
to have been made, and as noted in the summary 
of outcomes of the 5th International Workshop 
on Volcanic ash convened in santiago (chile) in 
march 2010, two days after the start of the current 
eyjafjallajökull eruption, ‘there continues to remain no 
definition of a “safe concentration” of ash for different 
aircraft, engine types or power settings’. 
this remained the situation until april 20th, when – 
in response to enormous external pressures – there 
appears to have been a shift by the uk caa to adopt 
a ‘reasonably practicable’ approach, broadly similar 
to that described in the Health & safety at Work 
etc act 1974. this resulted in the re-opening of air 
space following discussions on tolerance levels in 
low density ash areas with engine manufacturers that 
agreed safe ash concentration limits. these ad hoc 
thresholds were guided by output from the uk met 
Office atmospheric dispersion modeling program. 
details of the april 20th limits and other caa actions 
that had the effect of a progressive relaxation of flight 
restrictions in uk air space are shown in table 5.
current thresholds appear to represent an attempt 
to reduce the risk to alarp (as low as reasonably 
practicable (figure 10). The ALARP region lies between 
unacceptably high and negligible risk levels and even 
if the risk has been judged to be in the alarp region 
it is still necessary to consider introducing further risk 
reduction measures to drive the remaining (residual) 
risk downwards. the alarp level is only reached 
when the time, effort and cost of further reduction 
measures become disproportionate to the additional
Table 5. Progressive relaxation of CAA flight restrictions 
in uk air space
date action
20 april Three zones defined based upon ash 
concentrations in air space:
No Risk: below 200 μgm• -3  
enhanced procedures zone • 
(EPZ) (Red Zone): 200 μgm-3  to 
2000 μgm-3
no fly zone (nfz) (Black zone): • 
above 2000 μgm-3
11 may Removal of 60 nautical mile ‘no fly’ 
buffer zone around areas of ash density 
thought to be in excess of 2000 μgm-3 
17 may Introduction of time limited zones 
(TLZs) (Grey Zone): defined as volumes 
of air space ‘where ash concentrations 
are predicted to exist within which 
flight for a limited time duration may be 
permitted before engine manufacturer 
tolerance levels are exceeded’. these 
permit flights in air space where ash 
concentrations are deemed to fall 
between 2000 μgm-3 & 4000 μgm-3 
provided – amongst other caveats - 
that the operator has a safety case 
supported by data from the aircraft and 
engine manufacturers. 
risk reduction obtained. the original values that 
defined the ALARP upper and lower limits in this 
case, viz. 2000 μgm-3 and 200 μgm-3 are ad hoc 
and without scientific basis and were generated by 
a Met Office program that was designed for entirely 
different purposes. It is noteworthy, however, that the 
2000 μgm-3   above which the safety risk was deemed 
to be unacceptable is still 3 orders of magnitude less 
than the 2 gm-3 ash concentration in the two known 
cases of engine shutdown in mid-flight. The decision 
taken by the uk caa to set the upper threshold 
ash density based on a value generated by the met 
Office NAME program can be viewed as a form of 
risk transfer in light of the absence of guidelines and 
support from engine manufacturers who knew that 
this upper threshold ash density is unlikely, based on 
(Source: caa 2010a and 2010b)
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the previous two known cases, to cause catastrophic 
mid-flight failure 
the establishment and incremental evolution of ad 
hoc safety thresholds would not have been required 
had a safe ash limit been previously agreed. It may 
be, however, that it is not possible to define such a 
limit that will be sufficiently robust to guarantee normal 
engine performance across a full range of situations, 
engine types, aircraft and pilot responses (Guffanti 
& miller, 2002). While analyses of previous multi-
engine shutdown incidents have shown that the ash 
concentration when it happens is approximately 2 gm-3, 
it is still not known, even to the engine manufacturers, 
whether there is a threshold ash density above 
(and below) which the silicate melting risk will (and 
will not) pose an immediate problem to engines in 
mid-flight. Equally importantly, barring a complete 
in-flight engine stall, damage to turbine blades is, in 
general, a medium to long-term cumulative process 
that cannot be accurately accessed by borescoping 
(using a flexible endoscope), unless the engine is 
pulled apart and a detailed study undertaken on the 
flow and strength performance of the blades. There 
are currently few data that can help to constrain how 
much ash a jet engine can tolerate. consequently, 
any further easing of the current ad hoc and arbitrary 
thresholds should be seen as largely pragmatic 
responses to commercial pressures, rather than 
based on hard engineering science. to determine 
a range of robust, best-estimate safe levels of ash 
for a wide range of aircraft, engine types, situations 
and pilot responses will require time, money and the 
wholehearted commitment of the aviation industry.
In addition to leading directly to severe disruption, 
the failure of the aviation community to set safe ash 
levels also resulted in a witch-hunt that looked for 
someone to blame. as regulator, the caa suffered 
most, attacked by the public and – most ironically – 
by the airlines, for being over cautious. as previously 
discussed, the pre-cautionary approach for which the 
regulator was blamed, was determined by an ‘avoid 
ash at all costs’ protocol that had been agreed and 
followed by airlines for decades. nevertheless, the 
resulting disruption exposed the limitations of the 
precautionary approach. When the general public 
is exposed to risks it cannot avoid or control, there 
is always a strong case for regulatory intervention. 
Unlike airlines, the CAA does not benefit from the risk 
exposure of the general public. as the repercussions 
of the 6-day blanket ban on flights in April became 
clearer, however, the limits of the ‘public body 
hence more credible’ logic became apparent. the 
precautionary approach that led to the blanket ban 
was a direct continuation of the logic that led to 
the caa’s power to open or close uk skies: what 
mattered was the possibility of significant harm. Yet 
precautionary measures inevitably generate new 
risks. The ban on flights not only meant increased 
risks for all those travelling by other means; it also 
threatened the livelihood of whole economies. once 
the appealing simplicity of the precautionary approach 
breaks down, an array of difficult questions arises, 
including: which risks (and which benefits) ought to 
be taken into account? Who is to articulate the values 
(beyond safety) that ought to be addressed when 
managing risks?
When the uk caa established thresholds for safe 
ash concentration that allowed the resumption 
of commercial flights, it was keen to emphasize 
that its decision was based on data that were 
‘finally’ communicated to it by the aviation industry. 
reciprocally, the aviation industry expressed relief at 
the regulator ‘finally’ specifying a safe level of ash. 
Figure 10. the alarp region (aven, 2003)
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Summary: The recently defined safe limits are 
ad hoc and arbitrary and cannot be scientifically 
justified. Determining a range of robust, best 
estimate safe levels of ash for a wide range 
of situations, aircraft, engine types and pilot 
responses will cost time and money and the 
commitment of the aviation industry. the eruption 
demonstrated the limits of a precautionary 
approach.
hoW lonG iS thE diSruption likEly 
to laSt?
the most obvious transport impacts from the 
volcanic ash cloud have been the well-publicised 
cancellations of air flights across the UK and Europe 
and the associated global disruption of air transport 
and stranding of passengers. the deeper problem of 
the vital importance of air transport in supporting the 
industrial base, however, is much less apparent. 
the twentieth century manufacturing model means 
that transport systems are an essential component 
of the industrial process. today manufacturers keep 
hardly any stock as they operate on the principle of 
‘just-In-time’ delivery, which means that factories 
might now hold only a few hours’ stock. to maintain 
this situation there is heavy reliance on air transport. 
Consequently, had the flight bans continued for much 
longer, the economic impact would have been even 
more severe. not only would this have been felt by 
the airlines, but across the manufacturing spectrum. 
Because of the wide distribution of component 
producers around the world, large swathes of the 
developing world as well as the industrialised nations 
would have been impacted. for business continuity 
and planning, and the provision of essential goods 
and services, it is essential to have an idea of how 
long disruption might continue. 
phreatomagmatic eruptions in Iceland, such as the 
recent activity at eyjafjallajökull, typically produce 
short-lived strongly explosive episodes within longer 
mainly magmatic eruptions that may last months or 
more. Whilst it is particularly common for the first 
stage of activity at glaciated volcanoes to be strongly 
phreatomagmatic as the vent is cleared of ice, 
explosive episodes can occur at various times during 
eruptions. the 14 month-long 1821-23 eruption 
of eyjafjallajökull is amongst the longer Icelandic 
explosive eruptions, but is not exceptional. during 
that event there were three main explosive phases 
lasting from 1 to 25 days in december 1821, june 
1822 and july 1822 (larsen, 1999). at this stage it 
is not possible to say how much longer the current 
eruption at eyjafjallajökull will continue, but it could 
be anything from a few more months to a year or 
more. there is also the possibility of increased 
phreatomagmatic activity if new vents or fissures 
open up under the ice sheet.
Summary: activity at eyjafjallajökull only becomes 
a major problem over europe if increased activity 
is coincident with north to northwesterly air flow 
between Iceland and north West europe. our 
conservative estimate suggests that such air flow 
may prevail for 6% of the time. the implication is 
that the most recent period of air traffic disruption 
in mid-may, may not be the last, and may recur as 
long as the eruption continues.
the strict liability regime’s raison d’être is to protect 
vulnerable consumers from reckless, profit-driven 
risk-management: can it be said to induce a no-less 
dangerous agnostic attitude meant to shield risk-
managers from responsibility?
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table 6. Eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull and katla
Eyjafjallajökull katla
550 ± 50 yr 500  540  590  ± 50 yr
610  680  780  820 ± 50 yr
920 ± 50 yr 904?  920  934  950  960
1150 ± 50  1177  1262  1311 
1357
1416  1440  1450 ± 50  1500
1550 ± 50  1580
1612 1612
1625 1660 1721 1755
1821-23 1823
1860   1918





















Figure 12. hazard rate for eruptions of katla (applying 
methodology of la rocca, 2008)
Will nEiGhbourinG katla Erupt?
since the start of the eyjafjallajökull eruption there 
has been much speculation about an eruption of 
the larger katla volcano. on 20th april the Icelandic 
president said ‘the time for katla to erupt is coming 
close. It is high time to start planning for the eventual 
katla eruption’. 
katla is 1,500m high and partially covered by the 
mýrdalsjökull ice cap, which extends across 600 km². 
It contains a 10km diameter caldera, 700m deep and 
filled with ice. Eyjafjallajökull and Katla are subject 
to intense monitoring by the university of Iceland. 
Whilst it is true that historic eruptions of eyjafjallajökull 
(1612 and 1821-23) have been followed soon after 
by eruptions of katla, the  later is a far more active 
volcano that erupts more frequently, with some 21 
eruptions recognised in the historic period. these 
include much larger (up to VeI 5) explosive eruptions 
(most recently in 1625, 1755 and 1918) that are 
unconnected to activity at eyjafjallajökull.
In our preliminary Bayesian statistical analysis of 
the activity of Katla (figure 12), the hazard rate plot 
indicates katla has two states: one in which it erupts 
every 20 to 70 years (with increasing hazard rate), 
and the other a more quiescent state in which it erupts 
less frequently, at intervals of about 200 years. so the 
coincidence of the 1612 and 1821-3 eruptions could 
be simply a result of independent eruption cycles at 
the two volcanoes being in phase.
analysis of the seismic energy released around katla 
over the last decade or so (figure 13) is interpreted as 
providing evidence of a rising cryptodome (intrusive 
magma body) at Godabunga on the western flank 
of the volcano (sturkell et al., 2010). earlier seismic 
energy release at Katla is associated with the inflation 
of the volcano, which indicates it is close to failure, 
although this does not appear to be linked to seismicity 
around eyjafjallajökull. from the seismicity, we have 
calculated the thermodynamic parameter, q, which 
measures long-range interactions and long-term 
memory (Vallianatos, 2009). q has  a value of ~1.5, 
which does indicate there are long-range interactions 
in the seismicity. 
Figure 11. Eyjafjallajökull and katla (Source: veðurstofa 
islands, 2010)
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Summary: We conclude that given 
the high frequency of katla activity, an 
eruption in the short term is a strong 
possibility. It is likely to be preceded 
by new earthquake activity. presently 
there is no unusual seismicity under 
katla.
Figure 13. Seismic energy released in the katla area (Source: Sturkell et al., 2010)
arE WE likEly to SEE thiS Sort oF 
EvEnt aGain?
there is good evidence to suggest that volcanic 
activity in Iceland since ad1200 has a 130–140 year 
periodicity, with intervals of lesser activity lasting 
50–80 years alternating with higher activity of similar 
duration (larsen et al., 1998). Within this periodicity, 
eruption magnitude and volume of material erupted 
are not constrained (figure 14). 
since 1980 Iceland may have entered a new cycle 
of more frequent activity, which could equate to 6–11 
eruptions per 40 years (larsen et al., 1998). the 
heightened activity may be related to an episode of 
rifting along the constructive plate boundary running 
through Iceland. 
the sources of future ash hazard across europe 
may be volcanoes located outside Iceland. Within 
the north atlantic and the western half of europe 
there are a number of volcanic regions that have the 
potential to produce highly voluminous ash plumes 
that reach high altitude. In particular the azores (e.g., 
furnas), the canary Islands (e.g., tenerife), Italy 
(e.g.,Vesuvius, campi flegrei and etna) and the 
Aegean (e.g., Santorini) are worthy of mention (figure 
15).





(    )
Peaks in strain release in South Iceland Seismic Zone (Stefánsson & Halldórsson, 1988)
Episodes of rifting in the Northern Volcanic Zone
Major fissure eruption in the Eastern Volcanic Zone
Figure 14. Forty year running average of number of eruptions 
within vatnajökull (Source: larsen et al., 1998)
Figure 15. possible sources of ash hazard in the western 







hoW can WE bEttEr prEparE For 
Such EvEntS?
the air travel infrastructure (including aircraft, 
airports, air traffic control, airlines, aviation 
authorities, manufacturers, and travel agents) 
together comprises a complex system that was very 
significantly disrupted by the Eyjafjallajökull eruption. 
With foresight and investment, it would not be difficult 
to reduce disruption significantly. Critically, it has to 
be recognised that:
for whatever reason, air travel across the • 
uk and europe may again be disrupted for 
a prolonged period (e.g. following a series 
of terrorist incidents) and contingency plans 
for this should be established. 
Ways need to be established to maximise • 
safe air travel during such periods.
In relation to the hazard associated with volcanic ash, 
we make the following recommendations:
recognition – the potential threat 
presented by volcanic ash to aviation 
should be added to the national risk 
register and should include ash sourced 
at other volcanic centres in the region 
(such as the canary Islands and Vesuvius 
and campi flegrei in Italy) as well as at 
Icelandic volcanoes. associated problems 
arising from volcanically-sourced clouds of 
sulphur dioxide should also be included.
characterisation – national capabilities 
for measuring and predicting the extent 
and character of volcanic ash around our 
air space should be enhanced, including 
developing a better understanding of the 
volcanic hazard from Iceland and other 
european and atlantic sources of ash. 
modelling of scenarios for future eruptions 
and ash plume dispersion should be 
undertaken.
analysis – while the 200 and 4000 μgm-3 
thresholds are useful, they are not explicitly 
based on empirical experience other than 
that they appear to be ‘safe’. these levels 
need to be reviewed. such analysis should 
take into account the type of aircraft, age of 
aircraft, engine make, flight path, frequency 
of service, ground maintenance capabilities, 
pilot behaviour and other characteristics, 
so that a clear and consistent picture of risk 
is obtained. although this makes a clear 
‘no fly’ message more convoluted it would 
prevent the necessity of a highly disruptive 
blanket ban. acknowledging the emotive 
nature of the issue and the vested interests 
and commercial pressures involved, and 
to balance precaution and pragmatism, we 
propose an independent review panel with 
appropriate expertise to set robust, best-
estimate, safe levels for volcanic ash.
Summary: Air traffic is highly likely to be disrupted 
by future eruptions at volcanoes in Iceland or 
elsewhere in the region. consequently there is 
a serious need to be better prepared in order to 
minimise impacts. In this regard, we present a 
series of recommendations in the next section.
there is no doubt that future moderately to highly 
explosive eruptions in Iceland and elsewhere, 
coupled with appropriate meteorological conditions, 
will cause further disruption to air transport. potential 
volcanic sources of ash are well known, but it is 
very difficult to predict when an eruption will occur 
and at exactly what scale. However, although highly 
complex, it is possible to model scenarios for future 
volcanic eruptions, which include location of the 
potential ash source, duration and explosivity of the 
eruption, volume and particle size of ash generated, 
atmospheric residence time of the ash plume, and 
meteorological conditions.
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regulation – to minimise chaos, ill-
feeling and exploitation, regulation should 
be considered to manage the actions of 
organisations such as airlines at times of 
emergency. these might include approval 
of night operations at airports; insistence 
that no plane flies with empty seats (even 
at higher classes) if passengers with 
valid tickets are stranded (i.e. no-charge 
upgrades to fill seats); and fixing fares 
during the affected period.
communication –  a communications 
centre should be established that advises 
the public and which all affected bodies are 
required to support. this would avoid the 
huge expense of individuals trying without 
success to contact airlines and other 
transport bodies. efforts should be made 
to enable such a communications plan 
to make use of the resources available 
to the media in communicating advice 
objectively.
planning – at a national level plans should 
be developed to deal with the long term 
grounding of aircraft, including consideration 
given to the financial impact on stakeholders 
as well as arrangements for repatriation 
of travellers. at an international level, we 
reiterate the principal recommendation 
of the uk Government natural Hazards 
Working Group (2005), vis-a-vis the 
establishment of an international science 
panel to catalogue, evaluate and raise 
awareness of regional natural hazards 
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